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92 Commission on Judicial Performance 
Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General 
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMAr\CE. LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. Specifies 
the powers which the Commission on Judicial Performance may exercise if, after conducting a preliminary 
investigation, it determines that formal disciplinary proceedings should be instituted against a judge. Such powers 
would permit public hearings on charges of moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, and require public hearing at 
request of judge charged absent good cause for confidentiality. Shortens the term of specified members of the 
Commission from 4 to 2 years in order to provide for staggered tenns. Prohibits members from serving more than two 
4-year terms. Summary of Legislative Analyst's estimate of net state and local government fiscal impact: This measure 
would have a minor impact on state costs. 
Final Vote Cast by the Legislature on SCA 6 (Proposition 92) 
Assembly: Ayes 72 
:\oes 0 
Senate: Ayes 36 
Noes 0 
Analysis by the Legislative Analyst 
Background 
Under the California Constitution, the Commission on 
Judicial Performance investigates complaints regarding 
the conduct of judges. 
The Commission on Judicial Performance consists of 
nine members. These members include five judges, who 
are appointed by the Supreme Court; two members of 
the State Bar of California, who are appointed by the 
State Bar's Board of Governors; and two representatives 
of the public, who are appointed by the Governor and 
approved by the Senate. The members serve four-year 
tenns. There is no express requirement that the terms be 
staggered. Moreover, there are no provisions specifying 
whether members may be reappointed. The commis-
sion's recommendations for discipline of judges are sub-
ject to review and approval by the California Supreme 
Court. 
The commission receives, on average, about 400 com-
plaints against judges each year and determines that 
about five cases warrant hearings. The complaints are 
handled on a confidential basis, but become public when 
they are filed with the Supreme Court. For less serious 
cases of misconduct, the commission may privately rep-
rimand a judge. The Supreme Court may, but is not 
required to, review these actions. For cases involving 
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serious misconduct, the commission may recommend to 
the Supreme Court that judges be suspended, censured, 
retired, or removed. 
Proposal 
This constitutional amendment shortens the terms of 
specified members of the Commission on Judicial Perfor-
mance to two years in order to provide for sta~ ed 
tenns. The measure also prohibits members from se. ~ 
more than two four-year tenns, but authorizes a mem~r 
whose term has expired to continue serving until a 
successor is appointed. In addition, this measure specifies 
that if the commission determines that formal proceed-
ings should be instituted, the judge or judges charged 
may require the hearings to be public, unless the com-
mission finds good cause for making them confidential. 
The measure also allows the commission, without further 
review by the Supreme Court, to issue a public repri-
mand, with the consent of the judge, for conduct war-
ranting discipline. It further allows the commission to 
issue press statements or releases, and explanatory state-
ments, as specified, or, in some instances, to open hear-
ings to the public. 
Fiscal Effect 
This measure would have a minor impact on state costs. 
G88 
T ext of Proposed Law 
This amendment proposed by Senate Constitutional 
A.mendment 6 (Statutes of 1988, Resolution Chapter 67) 
pv ..... T'essiy amends tne Constitution by amending sections 
eof: therefore. existing provisions proposed to be 
deleted are printeci in !3tf'iiEesHt ~ and new provisions 
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate 
that they are new. 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE n, 
SECTIONS 8 AND 18 
First-That SectIon 8 of Article VI thereof is amended 
to read: 
SEC. 8. (a) The Com.mission on Judicial Perfor-
mance consists of 2 judges of courts of appeal, 2 judges of 
superior courts, and one judge of a municipal court, each 
appointed by the Supreme Court; 2 members of the State 
Bar of California wno have practiced law in this State for 
10 years, appointed by its governing body; and 2 citizens 
who are not judges, retired judges, or members of the 
State Bar of Cal~fornia, appointed by the Governor and 
approved by the Senate, a majority of the membership 
concurring. AH Except as provided in subdivision (b), all 
terms are 4 years . .vo member shall serve more than 2 
4-year terms. 
Coffimission membership terminates if a member 
ceases to hold the position that qualified the member for 
appointment. A vacancy shall be filled by the appointing 
power for the remainder of the term. A member whose 
term has expired may continue to serve until the vacancy 
hI" l,een filled by the appointing power. 
) ) To create staggered terms among the members of 
the Commission on Judicial Performance. the following 
members shall be appointed, as follows: 
(1) The court of appeal member appointed to immedi-
ately succeed the term that expires on November 8. 1988. 
shall serve a 2-year term. 
(2) Of the State Bar members appointed to immedi-
ately succeed terms that expire on December 31, 1988, one 
. member shall sen'e for a 2-year term. 
Second-That Se'ction 18 of Article VI thereof is 
amended to read: 
SEC. 18. (a) A judge is disqualified from acting as a 
judge, without loss of salary, while there is pending (1) an 
indictment or an information charging the judge in the 
United States with a crime punishable as a felony under 
California or federal law, or (2) a recommendation to the 
Supreme Court bv the Com.mission on Judicial Perfor-
mance for removal or retirement of the judge, • 
(b) On recommendation of the Commission on Judi-
cial Performance or on its own motion, the Supreme 
Court may suspend a judge from office without salary 
when in the United States the judge pleads guilty or no 
contest or is found guilty of a crime punishable as a felony 
under California or federal law or of any other crime that 
involves moral turpitude under that law. If the conviction 
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is reversed suspension terminates, and the judge shall be 
paid the salary for the judicial office held by the judge for 
the period of suspension. If the judge is suspended and 
the conviction becomes final the Supreme Court shall 
remove the judge from office. 
(C) On recommendation of the Com.mission on Judi-
cial Performance the Supreme Court may (1) retire a 
judge for disability that seriously interferes with the 
performance of the judge's duties and is or is likely to 
become permanent, and (2) censure or remove a judge 
for action occurring not more than 6 years prior to the 
commencement of the judge's current term that consti-
tutes wilful misconduct in office, persistent failure or 
inability to perform the judge's duties, habitual intemper-
ance in the use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the 
judicial office into disrepute. The esfftfftissisft Commis-
sion on Judicial Performance may privately admonish a 
judge found to have engaged in an improper action or ft 
dereliction of duty, subject to review in the Supreme 
Court in the manner provided for review of causes 
decided by a court of appeal. 
( d) A judge retired by the Supreme Court shall be 
considered to have retired voluntarily. A judge removed 
by the Supreme Court is ineligible for judicial office and 
pending further order of the court is suspended from 
practicing law in this State. 
( e) A recommendation of the Commission on Judicial 
Performance for the censure, removal or retirement of a 
judge of the Supreme Court shall be determined by a 
tribunal of 7 court of appeal judges selected by lot. 
{f) If, after conducting a preliminary investigation, 
the Commission on Judicial Performance by vote deter-
mines that formal proceedings should be instituted: 
( 1) The judge or judges charged may require that 
formal hearings be public, unless the Commission on 
Judicial Performance by vote finds good cause for confi-
dential hearings. 
(2) The Commission on Judicial Performance may, 
without further review in the Supreme Court, issue a 
public reproval with the consent of the judge for oonduct 
warranting discipline. The public reproval shall include 
an enumeration of any and all formal charges brought 
against the judge which have not been dismissed by the 
commission. 
(3) The Commission on Judicial Performance may in 
the pursuit of public confidence and the interests of 
justice, issue press statements or releases or, in the event 
charges involve moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corrup-
tion, open hearings to the public. . 
(g) The Commission on Judicial Performance may 
issue explanatory statements at any investigatory stage 
when the subject matter is generally known to the public. 
(h) The Judicial Council shall make rules implement-











92 Commission on Judicial Performance 
Argument in Favor of Proposition 92 
For our system of justice to work. it is absolutely 
necessarv that we have complete faith in our judges. 
For the most part, California has been blessed with a 
judiciary of integrity. While some citizens will always 
object to the policies of particular judges, few would 
question their honesty and basic decency. When judicial 
abuses do occur, however, they must be addressed 
promptly, decisively and with sufficient openness to 
assure continued public confidence. 
Our State Constitution provides for a Commission on 
Judicial Performance which investigates charges against 
judges and makes recommendations to the Supreme 
Court, including censure or removal from the bench 
when appropriate. 
The Supreme Court has the final word, but the com-
mission does the real work. Trouble is, the nine-member 
commission, including five judges and two attorneys, does 
its work in complete secrecy. The press and the public are 
barred from proceedings and any knowledge of the 
charges or facts in the case. 
Between 1960 and 1987, only 25 of the 7,185 complaints 
lodged with the commission resulted in public punish-
ment. Even if a judge has already been publicly tried and 
convicted of a misdemeanor, the disciplinary proceedings 
of the commission based on the same misconduct are 
closed to the public. 
Judges should not be subject to public suspicion based 
on a mere complaint but once formal charges are filed, 
perhaps the public should know. That is what happens in 
24 other states. That is how cases are handled involving 
doctors, lawyers, and other professionals. 
Proposition 92 proposes to open disciplinary proceed-
ings against judges in a limited but reasonable way. It 
does not require public proceedings following formal 
charges as in other states. It simply allows an accused 
judge or the commission to open proceedings subsequent 
to formal charges fu appropriate cases. Due to the high 
quality of our judiciary, this change poses no threat ~of 
endless public spectacle. After all, in 1987 only five judges 
in California faced any formal charges at all. 
Proposition 92 also includes provisions which allow the 
accused judge and the commission to agree to a public 
reprimand as well as provisions which stagger the terms 
of commission members. 
This proposition was drafted in part by the Commission 
on Judicial Performance itself, with the help of the 
Judicial Council and the California Judges Association. All 
agree that the primary job of the commission is to protect 
the public from judicial misconduct. All believe this 
amendment represents a sensible accommodation of the 
public interest. 
We're proud of our judges and the fine work they do. 
But every public official, no matter how high the office, 
must ultimately be accountable to the public. When the 
integrity of our courts comes under question, we can ill 
afford to be bound by a rule which concludes in every 
case that the public and press are better off in the dark. 
Such absolute secrecy is the antithesis of democracy. 
Provide a little sunlight in this critical area of govt..~ 
ment. Vote yes on Proposition 92. t. '-:1 
ED DAVIS 
SIDle 5entJtor, 19th DUtrict 
BILL LOCKYER 
SIDle 5entJtor, 10th District 
TOM McCLINTOCK 
Member of the Assembly, 36th DUtrict 
Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 92 
I agree with the proponents that we need complete 
faith in our judges and therein lies our difference. The 
proponents do not go far enough in their proposal in 
changing the commission on judicial performance. If 
you're going to amend the Constitution then do it right 
the first time. 
Too many ignorant and incompetent lawyers are ap-
pointed as judges who too often become arrogant in their 
security of immunity. The record of the commission on 
judicial performance, given by the proponents, i.e., only 
25 out of 7,185 complaints resulted in public punishment 
in 27 years speaks for itself-wimpy-merely a wrist-
slapping public entity that is neither useful nor cost 
effective in its present state. Their poor record is under-
standable-presently there are 5 judges, 2 lawyers, and 2 
laypeople on the commission who recommend to the 
Supreme Court (more lawyer-justices) to censure or 
remove a brother. 
Change it to 5laypeople (women and minorities should 
be represented), 2 judges, and 2 lawyers and give them 
some teeth by letting them have the sole power to 
censure or remove rogue judges. Only then would the 
public's confidence be restored in their judicial system. 
VOTE NO on Prop 92. The legislators need to place 
another measure on the ballot with the above recommen-
dations. 
STEVE D. WILSON, Ph.D. 
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Argument Against Proposition 92 
The Commission on Judicial Performance consists of 5 
judges, 2 lawyers and 2 nonlawyers serving terms of 4 
years. The function of the commission is to investigate 
alleged judicial misconduct and take appropriate action. 
The Commission on Judicial Performance may clear a 
judge of any wrongdoing or admonish a judge if miscon-
duct is found. The commission may also recommend that 
the California Supreme Court censure or remove a judge 
from office. 
When one considers how judges gain office, it becomes 
quite evident why California needs an active, indepen-
dent Commission on Judicial Performance. 
Judges of the trial courts in California's 58 counties 
(called justice courts, municipal courts and superior 
courts) are supposed to be elected; however, the State 
Constitution provides that vacancies may be filled by 
appointment of the Governor. When a new judgeship is 
created or when a local judge retires, a vacancy exists and 
the Governor makes an appointment. Once appointed, 
the new judge will never be on the ballot unless a local 
lawyer has the unmitigated gall to run against the appoin-
tee and give local voters a choice in the matter. 
J •. ';es of the higher, appellate courts (the court of 
ap:. • and the California Supreme Court) are appointed 
. the Governor, confirmed by a Commission on Judicial 
,.J'pointments and serve the unexpired portion of the 
12-year terms held by their predecessors. At the next 
gubernatorial election, appellate court judges (actually 
called "justices") appear on the ballot for approval or 
rejection by voters. If appellate court justices are rejected 
by voters. the Governor has the opportunity to appoint 
replacements. 
A lot of money is at stake in California's court system. 
\1ultimillion-dollar lawsuits are pending. The potential 
for corruption certainly is present. 
Perhaps more important, however, is the need to 
control the arrogance of too many judges. We need a 
mechanism for instilling and ensuring humility and re-
spect for the law in those lawyers who manage to gain 
appointment to judicial office. 
Given that local attorneys are afraid to run against 
appointed trial court judges and that voters seldom 
receive much information when it comes time to approve 
or reject appellate court justices, the Commission on 
Judicial Performance is left to hold judges accountable 
and ensure that ours is a system of laws and not men. 
That brings us to Proposition 92. This measure would 
stagger the terms of the 9 members of the commission 
and establish a two-term limit. , 
A two-term limit is desirable for many government 
positions, although, in this case, a one-term limit would be 
better. 
Staggering terms is j\:OT desirable because periodically 
replacing the entire commission could allow new mem-
bers to replace the entire staff and completely revise the 
operation, if necessary . 
Voters should reject Proposition 92 and the Legislature 
should place on the ballot another measure that would 
establish a one-term limit and provide for more than 2 
nonattorneys on the commission. 
STEVE D. WILSON, Ph.D. 
Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 92 
Since its creation in 1960, the Commission on Judicial 
Performance has responded to complaints involving the 
conduct of judges. While the judges of California are not 
perfect, they have forged a tradition of excellence of 
which we can be proud. Proposition 92 seeks to ensure 
California's position as a national leader in the law. 
Occasional breaches of judicial conduct are inevitable 
but no major or systematic problem exists in California. 
Accordingiy, Proposition 92 has been drafted with the 
objective of assuring continued public confidence in a 
fine system through increased openness. 
Mter 28 years it is appropriate that some adjustments 
be made to the operation of the Commission on Judicial 
Performance. 
The argument against Proposition 92 indicates that the 
oppr-~nt shares some of the same objectives as those who 
sUI-. ~ Proposition 92. While it is difficult to determine J most appropriate degree of scrutiny, it is clear that 
both opponent and proponents desire greater public 
accountability. The differences in perspective appear 
minor. 
Proposition 92, which is the product of numerous open 
hearings in the Legislature, was drafted with the expert 
assistance of the Commission on Judicial Performance 
and is designed for the sole purpose of making the 
Commission more responsive to the needs of the public. 
Proposition 92 is not intended to allay the concerns of 
every disgruntled litigant, or resolve every potential 
problem with the judiciary, but is a sound move in the 
right direction. 
V ote yes on Proposition 92. 
ED DAVIS 
State Senator, 19th District 
BILL LOCKYER 
State Senator, 10th District 
TOM McCUNTOCK 
Member of the Assembly, 36th District 
G88 Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency 59 
: i 
f '-
l' 
. i\,......., 
